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Project Apollo and the Cold War: Understanding the Space
Race as Ritual Combat
Hal Issen
Why did we go to the moon? Even the astronomers who worked on Project Apollo could not
pretend that it was inspired by a driving love of science. It is hard to believe that the urge to explore
was the motive; less than one-percent of the surface was ever explored by man. Three out of ten
missions were canceled before the program was abandoned twenty-five years ago, with no plans
to return. What did Project Apollo mean?
If The Soviet Union was first in outer space,
that is the most serious defeat the United
States has suffered in many, many years.
John F. Kennedy
1960 Presidential Campaign
I cannot, for the life of me, see any reason
why we should be using or misusing military
talents to explore the moon.
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Presidential Press Conference
November 4, 1959
The existence of an area of free land, its con-
tinuous recession, and the advance of Ameri-
can settlement westward, explain American
development.
Frederick Jackson Turner
The Frontier in American History, 1920
President Kennedy proposed Project
Apollo at a special session of Congress on
May 25, 1961 after only four months in office.
His campaign claims of Soviet superiority in
missiles and space
had raised alarms about declining American
influence. While many of his claims about
weapons were fabrications,
the public had not forgotten the panic caused
by Sputnik I, launched by the USSR on Octo-
ber 4, 1957. President Eisenhower was be-
mused by all the hand-wringing and cries of
doom, and impatient with the mad rush to
drain the national treasury. Eisenhower knew
that Sputnik was not a serious security threat
because it could not be maneuvered in orbit,
and that the US could have launched more
sophisticated satellites before the Soviets. But
the US had been concentrating its efforts on its missile system. Eisenhower was concerned with
building a strong defense without getting deeply into debt. After that was in place he was inter-
ested in a modest space  program, but insisted that it be strictly scientific. Perhaps in retrospect
Eisenhower’s vision can be appreciated as being more accurate, but Kennedy’s hectoring of
Eisenhower for a ‘Missile Gap’ and Sputnik was more persuasive, and probably was a decisive
point in his election over Nixon. Why did the public believe Kennedy’s interpretation of looming
catastrophe instead of accepting  Eisenhower’s reasonable assessment of the facts?
The significance of the Soviet space program  was shaped by a set of values encoded in the
American national identity. Kennedy’s interpretation proposed that the Soviet advances in space
were not an actual threat to our defenses, but
rather represented a decline in American su-
periority. This appealed to the American self-
identity of
being strong, resourceful, rugged, and opti-
mistic. The historian Frederick Jackson Turner
was the first to tie this identity to the settle-
ment of the American Frontier. Americans
proudly trace their heritage to pilgrims and pioneers. Turner proposed that the West was a place of
clear opportunities and demands. He explained that the uniquely American character of individual-
ism and practicality was strengthened by the challenges and ordeals of taming the Western fron-
tier. The rugged individualists who settled the West  were responsible for developing national
resolve, and provided leadership for those who remained in the stagnant, institutionalized East.
Turner’s work has since been re-evaluated by studying the institutions that made it possible to
settle the Western Frontier. While there is no doubt that the pioneers needed perseverance and
fortitude, it is also true that they could not have survived without bureaucratic institutions such as
railroads and Army posts. The West was actually an outpost that funneled raw resources into the
developed East. Those who settled the West were no more inherently endowed with virtue than
those who stayed to build commerce in the East. But Turner’s explanation for America’s strength,
as illustrated by stories of  rugged frontiersmen such as Dan’l Boone and Davey Crockett, cap-
tured the public’s affection. These stories became referential models to those who tried to under-
stand America’s power. The impact of Turner’s thesis became greater than if all of his interpreta-
tion was factual. Turner’s Frontier thesis became a myth.
Myths are stories that contain a value system. The word ‘myth’ is often used to mean ‘untrue.’
However, the value system within a myth has a significance to the people who know the story,
even if  the particular events of that myth never happened. The truth of a myth is in its power to
motivate people towards particular action.
The Homeric world owes its unity to its being
a literary creation. Once it is submitted to a
historical analysis, different, more or less com-
patible layers become apparent, detectable
in the weaponry, the modes of combat, and
the varying social and psychological status of
the warrior.
Jean-Pierre Vernant
Myth and Society in Ancient Greece
Myths are often associated with ancient
cultures. For example, ancient Athens is re-
membered as much for the stories of the
Olympian pantheon of gods as it is for its con-
tributions to Western thought, such as scien-
tific reasoning, theater, and democracy. For a
brief period Athens was the center of a Hel-
lenic culture that was united by a view of the
world that had its origins in the Greek myths
told by Homer and Hesiod. Honor was the
highest virtue in that  worldview, and the nor-
mal state of being was competing for honor
against everyone else. One source for this
structure of reality is in Homer’s Iliad. This is
the story of two great nations locked in a ten-
year war to regain the honor of a king whose wife had run off with a foreign prince. The Athenians
identified themselves as brave and noble people because they associated themselves with the
heroes in those myths. We might wonder if it was a war worth fighting, but the Homeric myths
explain why this was a legitimate cause in the Greek way of thinking. According to Homer the only
way to regain honor after such a dishonor was to fight for it and win it back. The Iliad illustrates
virtue in aggression, pride, loyalty, the ability to fight well, and it encouraged that type of behavior.
Many of the activities in Greek life were spent acting out the value system contained in these
myths. The many rituals honoring the gods, the countless wars between the city-states, election to
public office, marriages and funerals were enactments of Homeric honor.
As illustrated by these examples of the influence of the Homeric myths to Ancient Athens, all
myths share these common characteristics:
1. Myths offer ways of ordering existence. They give a model for the basic structure of
reality. Myths explain and give meaning to the outside events that affect a society.
2. Myths inform man about himself.  People take on a self-identity  based on historical events.
Myths connect a group of people as a selected order of humanity.
3. Myths express a saving power in human life. Myths provide salvation. They give hope
during hardship by illustrating the power to transform misfortune into triumph.
4. Myths provide patterns for human action. Myths encourage particular behavior. Stories
that embody ideal action illustrate the conduct  that is valued and virtuous.
5. Myths are enacted in ritual. The values in myths are expressed in symbolic acts.
The pioneers of old gave up their safety, their
comfort and sometimes their lives to build a
new world here in the West. . . . They were
determined to make that new world strong and
free, to overcome its hazards and its hard-
ships.... We stand today on the edge of a new
frontier-the frontier of the 1960’s-a frontier of
unknown opportunities and perils-a frontier of
unfulfilled hopes and threats.
John F. Kennedy
Democratic National Convention
July 15, 1960
[In the Old Testament] God, the creator and
sole governor of the universe, was absolutely
and always on the side of a certain chosen
community, and its wars, consequently, were
Holy Wars, waged in the name and interest
of God’s will.
Joseph Campbell
Myths to Live By
President  Kennedy used the myth of the
American frontier to interpret the events of the
Russian Space Program. The five character-
istics of myth can be seen in Kennedy’s
speech to the Democratic National Conven-
tion during the 1960 Presidential campaign.
He offers  a model of  reality as a world that is
full of hazards, hardships, and perils, but also
opportunities. He connected Americans to the
historic pioneers who tamed the West. He of-
fered the power of salvation through  deter-
mination and sacrifice. He encouraged action
to build a new world that was strong and free,
regardless of the cost, and held this conduct
up as being virtuous. Lastly, by using the
American frontier as a symbol for his admin-
istration, Kennedy issued a mythic call to en-
act these values in his programs and plans.
The Frontier myth is a call for action, and Kennedy was expected to come up with bold, new
initiatives after he had been elected. The Soviets and their communist surrogates were dealing
embarrassing set-backs to the US, especially during the Bay of Pigs crisis. Clearly some action
was required. But these activities involved confrontation and aggression against a heavily armed,
capable, and belligerent adversary. While the Frontier myth included battles, the marauding Na-
tives were seen more as a lethal menace than a threat to society. The Frontier myth only explains
the virtues of expansion; some other myth was needed to explain the significance of war.
The Old Testament calls for the righteous to rise up in arms and rid the earth of the wicked.
There cannot be co-existence with those who have not given themselves over to the highest moral
authority because their mere presence is an abomination, and hateful to God.
The Cold War was an ideological struggle between the US and the USSR for political and
economic world dominance. Both the US and the USSR were convinced of their alignment with
the highest moral authority, and neither
could tolerate each other’s continued ex-
istence.
The Communist Manifesto preached the
moral superiority of the socialist system and
called for the over-throw of capitalism. Fueled
by the rhetoric of Marx and Lenin, the Soviets
saw themselves on a noble mission to eradi-
cate capitalist exploitation. Even though it  was
officially an atheist state, the Soviet sense of
righteousness can be seen as having roots in
the Old Testament myth of war. The Western
nations saw communism as a creeping, subversive, insidious threat to all that was valued. A move-
ment resembling a holy crusade to rid the planet of communism prevailed in the West. Complicat-
ing matters were atomic bombs and guided missiles; making it a possibility to annihilate an enemy.
Full-scale nuclear war eventually had to be considered if the Old Testament was used to interpret
the significance of war.
War was quite natural to the Greeks of the
classical period. Organized, as they were, into
small cities, all equally jealous of their own
independence and equally anxious to affirm
their supremacy, they saw warfare as the
normal expression of the rivalry that governed
relations between states.
Jean-Pierre Vernant
Myth and Society in Ancient Greece
Unlike the Old Testament, the Trojan War
in Homer’s Iliad had nothing to do with the
righteousness of God. The Greeks and the
Trojans recognized the same gods, who might
intercede on either side depending on factors
that had nothing to do with righteousness. The
gods were only concerned with honor, and war
was one way to gain honor. The accomplish-
ments of  the Russian space program  were
interpreted by Kennedy as representing a
decline in American superiority. Because this
concept of national honor was so important
for his decision, looking at the structure of war
in the Iliad might provide a better understand-
ing of why the public endorsed Kennedy’s pro-
posal, and how Project Apollo owed its con-
The war has a time limit set upon it, for a cam-
paign normally takes place during the sum-
mer and ends before the onset of winter. The
decisive battle is fought on chosen ground, a
pedion, where it is possible to deploy the two
phalanxes of heavy infantry. Each of the cit-
ies waging war seeks not so much to annihi-
late its adversary, or even to destroy its army,
but rather to force it to acknowledge its supe-
rior strength as the outcome of a test as rule-
bound as a tournament.
Jean-Pierre Vernant
Myth and Society in Ancient Greece
struction to the ancient Greek myths.
The Greeks of the classic period lived in city-states that were proud of their independence and
self-determination.  While the Greek city-states defended themselves against foreign invaders,
such as the Persians in 479 BC, they also constantly fought wars against each other. The object of
Greek city-state warfare was different from that of defending against foreign invaders. These wars
were intended to demonstrate superior technical skills on a battlefield. Obviously this involved
killing, but the primary goal was not to wipe out the opposing army. It was to make it turn tail and
abandon the field. The battlefield might not have any particular strategic value, and may even be
abandoned after a victory monument had been erected. The competing armies would only fight for
a fixed period, although later battles involving
the same antagonists would inevitably follow.
In summary, the idealized structure of Greek
city-state war was to show up at a designated
place within a fixed time and secure victory
by demonstrating a superior mastery of the
technical skills of  warfare. The significance
of war, in this context, was to gain honor.
President Kennedy’s proposal to Con-
gress for Project Apollo has the same struc-
ture as the idealized Greek city-state war. He
established a time limit of “before the decade
is out.”  He had chosen the battlefield and set
a criterion for victory, that of “landing a man
on the moon and returning him safely to earth.”
By claiming that “no single project  in this pe-
riod will be more impressive to mankind,” he
explained the significance of the proposal as
gaining honor in the international community.
I believe that this nation should commit itself
to achieving the goal, before the decade is
out, of landing a man on the moon and re-
turning him safely to earth. No single project
in this period will be more impressive to man-
kind.
John F. Kennedy
Special Address to Congress
May 25, 1961
Armies, through the energy, discipline, and
stanches of their respective fighting men, are
the measure of the power and cohesion, the
dunamis, of the two civic communities con-
fronting each other.
Jean-Pierre Vernant
Myth and Society in Ancient Greece
Kennedy’s proposal was a challenge to Con-
gress and the American people to share his
vision and fund Project Apollo, but it was also
a declaration of war against the Soviets. It was
not a call for all-out annihilation as in the Old
Testament model of war, but a challenge to
gain honor by demonstrating technical excel-
lence. The Soviets understood the declara-
tion for what it was and accepted it, as proven
by the recent disclosures of their own lunar
landing program that was designed to  beat
the US. The international community also rec-
ognized the significance of Project Apollo, as
shown by the overwhelming praise and con-
gratulations given to the Apollo crews after
their successful missions.
Kennedy gave a structure for Project Apollo that equated technological excellence  with cul-
tural superiority; this is a mythic structure in accord with the first characteristic of myths. Unlike
Eisenhower, Kennedy interpreted Soviet advances in space as a challenge to the American self-
image of optimistic and determination. This self-identity, connected to the American pioneers,
fulfills the second characteristic of myths. He claimed that the impressive accomplishment of Project
Apollo had the power to regain international honor  and save America.  Apollo’s power to save
agrees with the third characteristic of myths.
If the Space Race was a mythic structure of war, than the astronauts and cosmonauts were the
warriors who gained honor for their people. The ancient Greeks believed that the strength and
abilities of their warriors represented the collective virtue of their societies, and that victory in battle
by their army was an indication of the superi-
ority of their city- state. The astronauts were
given hero status. While there were certainly
benefits to being a hero, the scrutiny that was
put on their personal conduct was sometimes
puzzling, annoying, and even chafing to them.
They were men who had been selected based
on their skills as pilots, and not necessarily
for their virtuous personal conduct.
A myth encourages certain behavior per
the third common characteristic. In the
Homeric structure of war, victory by the astro-
nauts was symbolic of the supremacy of
American society. The American public’s self-
image as virtuous people could not be vali-
dated by degenerate astronauts. Because vir-
tue is supposed to triumph in the Homeric
myths of honor, a victory by immoral astronauts would be a confusing mixed signal at best, and
perhaps even a defeat. The “all-American” image of the astronauts was an important part of the
mythic structure of Project Apollo.
The last characteristic of myth is that it is enacted in ritual, and the Greek structure of city-state
warfare incorporated this aspect of myth. Setting limits on the time and location for battle and
criteria for victory resembles an athletic competition more than combat. Some battles were even
Those who take part in the Games confront
each other in the name of the same city-state
as those that go to war against each other.
Jean-Pierre Vernant
Myth and Society in Ancient Greece
What is most important in naval warfare is
maneuverability of the craft and all that this
entails in the way of training, experience, and
inventiveness, and adequate state funds.
Jean-Pierre Vernant
Myth and Society in Ancient Greece
arranged to be fought as tournaments be-
tween individual champions or small teams,
while the rest of the army watched from the
sidelines without interfering. The ancient
Greeks used this same structure in the famous
Panhellenic games, which we have adapted
as the modern Olympic games. The astro-
nauts were applauded because they repre-
sent our country as Cold War warriors in ritual
combat in the same way that we cheer on our
athletes. A tournament structure requires a set
of rules; the US and the USSR signed United
Nations agreements on peaceful uses of
space that served as the tournament rules
during the Space Race.
The Athenians were particularly successful in naval combat, which was another use of the
tournament structure. Ancient Greek warships were triremes; long, thin, and low-draught vessels
that were powered in combat  by oarsmen in three ascending levels.  Each trireme had a crew of
200, of which 170 were rowers and the rest were officers, provisioners, archers, and combat
marines. The objective of battle was to ram the enemy ship; maneuverability was very important
and the steering oarsman’s skill was critical. But collective discipline was also important because
each rower’s strokes had to be coordinated with those ahead and behind, as well as any above or
below. The crews trained constantly to master these skills. Athens has a fleet of  over 400 ship at
its peak and had to hire professional rowers to fill the 68,000 slots. On top of the rower’s pay, the
large fleet was expensive to build and maintain. Taxes from the state treasury paid for the large
fleet, and commerce was developed as a re-
sult of all the spending. The port-town of
Piraeus thrived as a ship-building and ship-
ping center.
Project Apollo was also a large-scale pub-
licly funded project that stimulated commerce,
provided jobs, and contributed to national
pride. The project was supported by large
numbers of anonymous workers who were
sometimes mercenaries looking for employ-
ment. Local communities, such as Brevard
county, thrived as a result. The engineers
managing their systems during a launch se-
quence had to be as coordinated as the banks of oars sweeping the water to bring as a trireme
around to ram another warship. All this effort supported one individual responsible for guiding the
vessel, and victory or defeat depended on his skill. Just as the Greeks built a ritual structure for
their naval warfare based on the Homeric myths of honor, the superpowers also constructed the
Space Race into ritualized and symbolic actions.
Summary and Conclusion
For some of those involved in the lunar
landing decision, space activity appeared
to be a ‘surrogate’ for [military] capacities,
involving them in space-related work rather
than for military developments.
John Logsdon
The Decision To Go To The Moon
I talk to people who say, “Gosh, John, all
we gotta do is think back twenty-five years
ago and we can go to Mars the same way.”
I say, “No, you can’t. It was a unique set
of circumstances that lined up all those
dominoes.”
John Aaron
Apollo Flight Controller
Project Apollo was symbolic action that had a mythic structure of honor similar to Greek city-
state warfare. It satisfied the needs of the American people to challenge and defeat the commu-
nists. Eisenhower’s pragmatic vision could not see the value in ritual combat, while Kennedy
successfully used the Space Race as a symbolic competition for honor. The US and the USSR
was engaged in other struggles at the same time as the Space Race. The threat of nuclear warfare
hung over the military confrontations in Korea, Cuba, Berlin, and Vietnam. Apollo’s value contin-
ues to be questioned, but its cost and results could be compared to any one of these activities. The
value of Apollo might be considered in terms of it being a safe and productive area for the US and
the USSR to act out their competition for honor.
Project Apollo’s acceptance was due to
its particular structure that addressed specific
Cold War tensions. However, the same ten-
sions no longer exist, and the same construc-
tion is no longer appropriate for the human
exploration of space. But because of its suc-
cess, Project Apollo has become the referen-
tial model for all space exploration. Images
from Apollo are engraved in our culture; the
pictures of the earth rise and Buzz Aldrin on
the surface of the moon are two great icons
of our time. There is a resurgence of interest
in Apollo, and space exploration as the ‘final
frontier’ is a recognized formulation in books,
television specials, and movies. The drama
and grandeur of the space program have re-
newed interest in seeing its accomplishments
as a bold and noble time in our nation’s his-
tory. The lunar landing program is in the pro-
cess of becoming a narrative about the de-
velopment of American character and forti-
tude. Project Apollo is creating mythic propor-
tions of its own.
The opinions expressed are my own. They do not represent those of either the National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration or the United Space Alliance.
Hal Issen, USK-291, KSC FL 32899.
(407) 861-0821
Harold.Issen-1@kmail.ksc.nsas.gov
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